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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
DANNY WAYNE SMATHERS, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 15911 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by information with the 
crime of aggravated sexual assault in violation of Utah 
Code Ann., § 76-5-405. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Defendant was tried before a jury on March 13 and 14, 
1978, in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt 
Lake County, the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Jr., presiding. 
The jury returned a verdict of guilty. Defendant was 
sentenced to serve an indeterminate term of five years to 
life at the Utah State Prison. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an order of this Court affirming 
the conviction of appellant. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On the evening of November 9, 1977, defendant 
approached the prosecutrix, Ms. Judy Stapes, who was working 
as a bartender at Marion's Lounge in Murray, Utah (Tr. 8). 
Defendant and the prosecutrix engaged in light conversation 
and defendant asked her to go to breakfast with him (Tr. 8). 
She said no. Defendant asked her again and the prosecutrix 
declined, saying "No, I really don't feel like it" (Tr. 8). 
Defendant told the prosecutrix he needed "somebody to talk 
to" and she said she would go to breakfast. Defendant and 
Ms. Stapes drove in her car to the China Inn where they had 
breakfast. They left the China Inn at 2:10 a.rn. and Ms. 
Stapes drove back to Marion's Lounge where defendant had 
left his car (Tr. 9) • Defendant asked Ms. Stapes if she would 
go to bed with him and she refused.· Defendant then told 
her "I've got $100.00" (Tr. 10), and Ms. Stapes said, "You 
don't have enough money to buy me. Will you please just 
get ·out of the car and let me go home?" (Tr. 10). 
Defendant grabbed Ms. Stapes and shoved her up 
against the door. He grabbed the steering wheel and drove 
the car behind the lounge. Ms. Stapes tried to jump out and 
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defendant grabbed her by the hair (Tr. 10). Defendant got 
out of the car and knocked Ms. Stapes to the ground. He 
started ripping her clothes. Ms. Stapes scratched defendant 
on the nose (Tr. 11). Ms. Stapes testified at trial that 
she was terrified of defendant (Tr. 11), and that the 
defendant had told her he was "going to kill me and throw i:r.e 
in the river." Ms. Stapes suggested they go to a motel: 
"I thought if I could get him out on State Street where /I 
could find a police officer or even to a motel, I knew 
there would be people that would help me." (Tr. 10). 
Once again, defendant told Ms. Stapes he needed 
to talk and she suggested they go to her house and have 
coffee (Tr. 11). Defendant told Ms. Stapes he was "going 
somewhere where there are no cars." (Tr. 12). He kept 
asking Ms. Stapes to go to bed with him and she kept telling 
him no (Tr. 10,12). Defendant stopped the car and Ms. Stapes 
grabbed her purse, jumped out of the car and started to run 
towards the nearest house with the lights on (Tr. 13). She 
yelled "Help me. Please help me." Defendant tackled her 
on the lawn and started hitting her on the head, telling her 
if she didn't "shut up" he would kill her (Tr. 14). 
Ms. Stapes followed defendant back to the car. 
He ordered her into the back seat and told her to take off 
her clothes or he would kill her (Tr. 15). Defendant then 
had intercourse with the prosecutrix (Tr. 15) · 
-3-
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Defendant drove Ms. Stapes back to Marion's and got 
out of her car. She locked both doors and drove directly 
to St. Mark's Hospital (Tr. 18). 
Ms. Stapes was examined at St. Mark's Hospital 
by one Dr. James M. McGreevy, who testified at trial that 
she was bruised "principally about the eyes" (Tr. 67), and 
had "a minor laceration that did not require suturing above 
her right eye." Dr. McGreevy further testified at trial that 
the bruising "was considerable to the extent I thought it 
necessary to order examination of bony structures underneath 
the swelling and bruising to make sure there was no fracture 
of the bony structure of the eye socket as well as her 
skull. " Dr. McGreevy performed two standard tests, the 
results of which did not positively indicate the presence 
of sperm in the victim's vagina. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE IUFORMATION FILED WAS SUFFICIENT 
AND APPELLANT'S CONVICTION SHOULD BE 
AFFIRMED. 
Appellant argues on appeal that the information 
filed in this case was insufficient and alleges it failed to 
state facts sufficient to establish the offense charged. 
Respondent contends that in light of the statutory language 
found in Utah Code Ann., § 77-21-8 and supportive case law, 
appellant's argument is without merit. 
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The requirements for sufficiency of an information 
are found in Utah Code Ann., § 77-21-8, which states: 
(1) The information or indictment 
may charge, and is valid and sufficient 
if it charges the offense for which the 
defendant is being prosecuted in one or 
more of the following ways: 
(a) By using the name given to the 
offense by the common law or by a statute. 
(b) By stating so much of the 
definition of the offense, either in 
terms of the common law or of the 
statute defining the offense or in 
terms of substantially the same meaning, 
as is sufficient to give the court and 
the defendant notice of what offense is 
intended to be charged. 
(2) The information or indictment 
may ref er to a section or subsection of 
any statute creating the offense charged 
therein, and in determining the validity 
or sufficiency of such information or 
indictment regard shall be had to such 
reference. 
In this case, appellant was charged in an information 
which used the statutory name of the crime pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann., § 77-21-8 (1) (a), and also stated the particular 
of the offense, i.e., "That on or about the 10th day of 
November, 1977, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the 
said Danny Wayne Smathers raped Judy Stapes by the threat of 
death and serious bodily injury." (See. Tr. 5, 6, Record 12). 
The purpose of an information, as Utah Code Ann., 
§ 77-21-8(1) (b} states, is to give the court and defendant 
notice of the offense intended to be charged. An information 
-5-
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is not insufficient as appellant contends b · ecause it fails to 
state all the elements of the crime. See Peopl M e v · cFarla~, 
540 P. 2d 1073 (Colo., 1975). 
In a recent Utah case, State v. Taylor, 570 P.2d 
697 (Utah, 1977), where the defendant was convicted of theft 
of a firearm and appealed on grounds it was error for the 
Court, among other things, to refuse to dismiss the complaint 
because of failure to prove elements of theft as charged, 
this Court stated that: 
Offenses are validly and 
sufficiently charged by information 
or indictment which uses the name 
given to the offense by the cOriiii\On law 
or by statute. 
343 (Utah, 1975). 
See also Harris v. Smith, 541 P.i\ Id. at 698 (emphasis added). 
Appellant was charged with a specific crime, 
Aggravated Sexual Assault, and was given the details upon 
which that charge was founded. On this basis, defendant 
knew the crime with which.he was charged and was given a 
fair and adequate opportunity to prepare his defense. 
This Court in State v. Stites, 5 Utah 2d 101, 297 
P. 2d · 227 ( 19 56) , "las presented, in a misappropriation of 
corporate monies case, with the claim that the information 
was insufficient to apprise the defendant of the offense for 
which he was to be tried. The Court held that the employment 
of almost identical phraseology in the information as was 
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found in the statute defining the offense satisfied the 
provisions of § 77-21-8. The Court stated: 
We believe that the information 
also satisfied the general rule ap-
plicable where there may be no statute 
like 77-21-8. that the information 
must be sufficiently definite to (1) 
notify the defendant of the charge 
against him so as to enable him to 
prepare a defense, (2) identify the offense 
so that the defendant can successfully 
interpose a double jeopardy plea . . . 
and (3) apprise the court of the issues 
before it so that it can properly rule 
on questions of evidence and determine 
the sufficiency thereof. 
Id. at 229, (emphasis added) . 
In this case, the information charged appellant 
with the offense of Aggravated Sexual Assault, the statutory 
name for the crime he allegedly committed. Thus, the 
reasoning of Stites dictates that the information is suf-
ficient to give notice to both the Court and the defendant 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann., § 77-21-8. However, following 
the analysis of that case, the general requirements which 
would be looked to only in the absence of statutory 
provisions, are also met. Appellant was clearly given 
notice that he was charged with the offense of aggravated 
sexual assault, in violation of§ 76-5-405, Utah Code Ann., 
and given the specifics of the offense; the information 
alleged that appellant raped Judy Stapes on or about 
-7-
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the 10th day of November, 1977, by the threat of death 
and serious bodily injury (Record 12). 
Recent case law from other jurisdictions is also 
supportive of respondent's position. In State ex rel McKenzie I 
v. District Court of Ninth Judicial District, 525 P.2d 1211 
(Montana, 1974), where a challenge to amending an information 
in a criminal case was made, that Court held: 
The purpose of an information is 
to inform the defendant of what he is 
charged, nothing more nothing less 
no bill of particulars is called for, nor 
is a statement of all possible legal 
theories the prosecutor intends to pursue. 
It iS" not the function of an information 
to anticipate or suggest instructions to 
the jury, to argue the case, or to in-
fluence either public opinion or the 
jury. It is a notice device, not a 
discovery device. 
Similarly, the Idaho Supreme Court in State v. McKeeha:i 
430 P.2d 886 (Idaho, 1967), held that: 
The appellant was properly informed 
of the exact nature of the charge against 
him within the general criteria governing 
the sufficiency of an information and 
was afforded thereby the means by which 
to prepare a proper defense ... it is 
neither necessary or proper to allege 
evidence or disclose in the information 
the proof which the prosecution relied 
upon to establish the charge. 
In a recent Montana case, State v. Coleman, 579 p.2d 
732 (Mont., 1978), the defendant, charged with deliberate 
homicide, aggravated kidnapping and sexual intercourse 
without consent, challenged the information on grounds of 
-8-
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insufficiency. In rejecting his argument, the Court 
stated: 
. . . An information need only be 
sufficient to apprise the accused of 
the nature of the crime charged. It 
need not be perfect. 
Id. at 7 45. 
Furthermore, if appellant deemed the Information 
in this case to be insufficient, he could have requested · 
the trial court for a Bill of Particulars pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann., § 77-21-9. See State v. Crank, 105 Utah 332, 
142 P.2d 178 (Utah, 1943), and State v. Robbins, 102 Utah 
119, 127 P.2d 1042 (Utah, 1942). 
Additionally, the constitutionality of the short 
form information allowed by 77-21-7 and 8 has been upheld. 
State v. Hill, 100 Utah 456, 116 P.2d 392 (Utah, 1941); 
State v. Anderson, 100 Utah 468, 116 P.2d 398 (Utah, 1941); 
State v. Crank, 105 Utah 332, 142 P.2d 178 (Utah, 1943), and 
State v. Tacconi, 110 Utah 212, 171 P.2d 388 (Utah, 1946). 
(See also, State v. Landrum, 3 Utah 2d 372, 284 P.2d 693 
(Utah, 1955), where an indictment which charged that the 
defendants had "robbed Joseph Shepherd" met the requirement 
of Art. I. § 12 of the Utah Constitution. It advised the 
defendants of the nature and cause of the accusation against 
them and met the requirements of 77-21-8 because it charged 
-9-
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the defendants with having committed a crime and it stated 
the act which the defendants did constituting that crime). 
It is well settled that the purpose of an informatior, I 
is to serve as a notice device to a defendant to inform 
him of a specific charge against him and allow him to begin 
preparation for defense against that charge. See State v. 
Angus, 581 P.2d 992 (Utah, 1978). Here appellant knew he 
was charged with the crime of aggravated sexual assault 
and the details upon which such charge was premised. 
Respondent submits that in light of the statutory 
provisions cited above and the case law, the information in 
this case was sufficient and appellant's conviction should 
be affirmed. 
POINT II. 
THE STATUTORY PROVISIONS PERTAINING 
TO AGGRAVATED SEXUAL ASSAULT AND 
RAPE PRESCRIBE DIFFERENT PENALTIES 
FOR DIFFERENT CRIMES AND APPELLANT 
IS NOT ENTITLED TO THE PENALTY 
FOR RAPE ON A CONVICTION FOR AG-
GRAVATED SEXUAL ASSAULT. 
Appellant argues that the conduct prohibited under 
Utah Code Ann., § 76-5-402 for the crime of rape, a second 
degree felony, is the same conduct prohibited under Utah 
Code Ann., § 76-5-405 for the crime of aggravated sexual 
assault, a first degree felony. Appellant cites State Y.:. 
Loveless, 581 P.2d 575 (Utah, 1978), as authority for his 
position that since the two statutes prohibit the same 
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conduct, but impose different penalties, he should be 
entitled to the lesser penalty as a matter of law. 
Respondent concedes that if in fact the two 
statutes did prohibit the exact same conduct and imposed 
different penalties, appellant's reliance on this Court's 
decision in Loveless would be justified and he would be 
entitled to the lesser penalty. However, respondent avers 
that appellant's reliance on this Court's decision in 
Loveless is misplaced in thattheconduct prohibited by the 
two statutes is not identical and thus Loveless is not 
controlling here. 
In State v. Loveless, supra, the defendant was 
convicted by a jury of aggravated sexual assault, a felony 
of the first degree. Defendant appealed. The only matter 
relieduponby the State as an aggravating circumstance was 
the fact that the victim was under fourteen years of age at 
the time of the offense. The Loveless court determined that 
the two statutes did in fact prescribe different penalties 
for the same prohibited conduct. Specifically, if the victim 
of intercourse without consent were under fourteen years of 
age, the defendant could be charged with either aggravated 
sexual assault, a first degree felony, or rape, a second 
degree felony. Thus, the statutory language left the 
decision of whether to charge a first degree felony or a 
second degree felony to the discretion of the prosecutor. 
-11-
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The Court noted that the Legislature subsequently amended 
the statutes to make the crime of rape, where the victim 
is under fourteen years of age, a felony of the first degree 
and deleted the element of age as a circumstance of aggravated, 
sexual assault. 
Here, however, the prohibited conduct is not the 
same. The crime of aggravated sexual assault requires that 
the act of intercourse without consent be accomplished by 
"serious bodily injury to the victim", or that "the actor 
compels submission to the rape or forcible sodomy by threat 
of kidnapping, death, or serious bodily injury to be inflickj 
The crime of rape merely requires that .the intercourse takes 
place without the consent of the woman. Utah Code Ann., 
§ 76-5-406 (1) and (2), defines "without consent" as follows: 
An act of sexual intercourse, 
sodomy, or sexual abuse is without consent 
of the victim . • . 
(1) When the actor compels the victim 
to submit or participate by force that 
overcomes such earnest re?istance as might 
reasonably be expected under the circum-
stances; or 
(2) The actor compels the victim 
to submit or participate by any threat 
that would prevent resistance by a 
person of ordinary resolution. 
To determine whether a victim consented, this 
Court has looked to her age, strength, surrounding facts, 
State v. Ward, 347 P.2d 867 (Utah, 1959); to "threats of 
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immediate and great bodily harm which create in the mind of 
the female a real apprehension of dangerous consequences," 
State v. Nunez, 520 P.2d 882 (Utah, 1974); to whether she 
took advantage of a reasonable opportunity to escape or 
otherwise seek help. State v. Horne, 12 Utah 2d 162, 364 
P.2d 109 (1961); and to the conduct of the victim after 
commission of the assault. State v. Roberts, 91 Utah 117, 
63 p. 2d 585 (1937). 
In this case, the information charged defendant 
with the crime of aggravated sexual assault and the element 
of aggravation (serious bodily injury and threat of death) , 
was proven. The Court instructed the jury that if it could 
not find the defendant guilty of aggravated assault, then 
it could find him guilty of the lesser included offenses of 
rape or fornication, or not guilty at all. Thus, the jury 
determined that the evidence supported the charge as stated 
in the information, aggravated sexual assault, i.e., not 
only did the rape occur, but it was accomplished by serious 
bodily injury and threat of death. 
Appellant correctly cites Rammell v. Smith, 560 
P.2d 1108 (Utah, 1977), in support of his contention that 
where there are two statutes which proscribe the same conduct, 
but impose different penalties, the violator is entitled 
to the lesser. However, as the Court determined to be the 
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case in Rammell, respondent contends that the statutes 
pertinent here do not proscribe the same conduct. In 
Rammell, the defendant was convicted of a felony charge 
under the Controlled Substances Act, and challenged her 
conviction in a habeas corpus proceeding. She argued 
that since the offense of forgery under the Controlled 
Substances Act is a felony and the allegedly same offense 
under the Pharmacist's Act is a misdemeanor, she was entitled I. 
to the lesser penalty. The Court in Rammell stated: 
Proceeding to the main issue in 
this case; we agree with petitioner's 
premise that where there are two 
statutes which proscribe the same con-
duct, but impose different penalties, 
the violator is entitled to the lesser. 
The difficulty with petitioner's argument 
is that the two statutes referred to do 
not prohibit exactly the same conduct. 
Id., at 1109 (citation omitted). 
The Court held that the Controlled Substances 
Act applied more specifically to defendant's offense and 
took precedence over the more general act. Similarly, in 
this case, the crime of rape, a second degree felony, is the 
more general offense, while the crime of aggravated sexual 
assault, a first degree felony, is the specific act; thus, 
the two statutes prohibit different conduct and can correctly 
impose different penalties. In illustrating the difference i 
between the statutes in Rammell, this Court stated: 
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There is a significant and important 
difference between that statute and 
section 58-17-14.13 which creates the 
misdemeanor under which petitioner 
seeks the benefit of a lesser sentence. 
The latter section is in chapter 17 of 
Title 58, which is entitled, "Pharmacists." 
It deals generally with the dispensing of 
drugs by prescription and covers all 
drugs of every nature which have "been 
designated as unsafe for use except under 
the supervision of a practitioner," 
and it is not necessary that they be of 
the class of "hard drugs" proscribed in 
the "Controlled Substances Act." Inasmuch 
as the latter act applies more specifically 
to the petitioner's offense, it takes 
precedence over the more general act. 
Id. at 1109, 1110. 
Respondent submits that the statutes involved in 
this case are analogous to those discussed in Rammell, and 
that appellant's conviction for aggravated sexual assault, 
the more specific offense, should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent asks this Court to affirm appellant's 
conviction for aggravated sexual assault. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
CRAIG L. BARLOW 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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